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Introduction: Dangerous Dynamism in Asia’s Nuclear Future 
Christopher P. Twomey 
O ne of the defining elements of the post–Cold War era has been the diffusion of power away from the two superpowers. This has 
occurred across a wide variety of measures, including nuclear weaponry. 
In particular, since the end of the Cold War, proliferation across states and 
increasing arsenal capabilities within some of them have characterized 
Asia’s international security affairs. Given the importance of nuclear 
weapons to the development and conduct of the Cold War, we should expect 
these changes in the post–Cold War era to be similarly important. 
These changes have been the subject of significant scholarly analysis 
already. Dubbed the “second nuclear age” by eminent strategists Colin Grey 
and Paul Bracken, this epoch seems to pose new dangers and challenges.1 
Important debates have developed about the degree to which the most 
engaged dyad—India and Pakistan—is more dangerous than the dyads 
in the Cold War, to which nuclear weapons provided apparent stability.2 
Other studies have examined a broader range of countries facing this new 
environment.3 A burgeoning quantitative literature surveys both Cold War 
and post–Cold War crises and dyads to evaluate a wide range of hypotheses 
about stability and coercive leverage.4 
christopher p. twomey is Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He can be reached at <ctwomey@nps.edu>. 
note  The views expressed are those of the author alone. 
1  Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999); and Paul  
Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age (New York:  
HarperCollins, 1999).  
2  See, for example, S. Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International
Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 71–94; Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace: Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures 
and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): 38–78; Zafar Khan, “The Arrival 
of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: Deterrent Stability or Instability?” Comparative Strategy
32, no. 5 (2013): 402–17; and Michael D. Cohen, “How Nuclear South Asia Is Like Cold War 
Europe,” Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 3 (2013): 433–51. 
3  Muthiah Alagappa, ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia  
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).  
4 For more on stability and coercive leverage, see Erik Gartzke, Jeffrey M. Kaplow, and Rupal 
N. Mehta, “Nuclear Deterrence and the Structure of Nuclear Forces” (paper presented at 
the International Studies Association Annual Convention and the Midwest Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, 2013); Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority or the Balance of 
Resolve? Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization 67, no. 1 (2013): 141–71; 
and Mark S. Bell and Nicholas L. Miller, “Questioning the Effect of Nuclear Weapons on Conflict,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (2013). 
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To further these discussions, the National Bureau of Asian Research
(NBR) has initiated a broad-based research program entitled “Approaching
Critical Mass: Asia’s the Multipolar Nuclear Future.” With funding from the
Carnegie Corporation of New York and John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, the project began with the publication of Strategic Asia 2013–14:
Asia in the Second Nuclear Age in 2013.5 Building on this and other work, NBR
in January 2014 convened a conference jointly with the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies in Singapore to further explore several important themes.
Several key themes emerge from the essays in this roundtable. First 
and foremost, it is important to find the right geometric analogy to describe 
contemporary nuclear dynamics in Asia. Two promising candidates 
are nuclear triangles and nuclear hierarchies. While, as the essay by 
Rajesh Basrur reminds us, it is true that bipolar dynamics were not the 
only form of interaction during the Cold War, competition with the Soviet 
Union was the dominant driver for the United States for nearly the entire 
period. Today, for several countries, at least two other nuclear states play 
an important constitutive role in shaping nuclear policy. Thus, in Asia 
the United States worries about both Chinese and North Korean nuclear 
developments. The nature of the nuclear capabilities of those two states 
is dramatically different, and so is the nature of the strategic competition 
between the United States and each of them. This at least raises the possibility 
that steps taken to address one potential competitor are suboptimal with 
regard to the other. Similarly, P.K. Singh’s essay cogently makes the point 
that Indian strategic dynamics must be situated in a broader regional 
context that includes both Pakistan and China. Other interactive triangles 
may include the United States, China, and India or the United States, 
Russia, and China. Triangles might vary in terms of the degree to which 
they are tightly coupled (or not), in the symmetry across the different legs 
of the triangle, and likely in other dimensions. Further development of this 
concept is likely to be useful. 
Additionally, the essays raise the issue of nuclear hierarchies. While 
different arsenal sizes existed among different actors during the Cold 
War, today there is a greater degree of interaction among states with such 
different sized nuclear forces. Arsenals run from barely existent (North 
Korea) to midsized (China, India, and Pakistan) to large (United States). 
Although analogues to each existed in the Cold War (South Africa, France, 
5  Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Travis Tanner, eds., Strategic Asia 2013–14: Asia in the 
Second Nuclear Age (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2013). 
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and the Soviet Union, respectively), there was limited strategic interaction 
across those categories. Today, there is much more. 
Further, it is worthwhile to consider the traditional approaches to
hierarchies and ask whether such a descriptive moniker is accepted by the
players in the system. Can coercive leverage be exerted across the levels? Do
nations feel pressured to move up within the hierarchy? The limited pace of any
strategic arms racing (another common theme among the essays) suggests not. 
Beyond geometry, a second major theme to emerge from these papers 
is the complexity of managing extended deterrence in Asia’s second nuclear 
age. As highlighted by Noboru Yamaguchi’s and Benjamin Schreer’s 
contributions, changes in China’s capabilities are driving regional responses 
in terms of both internal and external balancing. Kang Choi’s essay raises 
a similar point with regard to the implications of North Korea’s nuclear 
development. These challenges are at once less and more dangerous than 
those presented by the security environment in the Cold War. During the 
Cold War, the intensity of the security dilemma in Central Europe was 
high, even in purely conventional terms. That is not the case now in Asia, 
neither across China’s first island chain nor across the Korean demilitarized 
zone. Yet that said, U.S. interests in Asia today are more susceptible to being 
doubted than U.S. interests in Europe were during the Cold War.6 
A third theme further complicates both core and extended deterrence: 
the source of the risk of violence. In the current Asian security environment, 
the threat of large-scale conflict erupting suddenly is relatively low. 
Instead, the dominant concern—expressed across all of the essays in this 
roundtable—is inadvertent escalation that begins with a lower-level crisis. In 
Japan, these are “gray zone” crises; in South Korea, they are “provocations.” 
India is concerned about a state-sponsored terrorist incident that escalates 
into military conflict, while China worries about U.S. allies overplaying 
their hands in territorial disputes over small islands or reefs. Nuclear 
weapons are far removed from these scenarios, to be sure. But this shift in 
the locus of conflict has implications for how we think about the utility of 
nuclear weapons, and the ensuing essays each grapple with this problem. 
There thus remains much work to be done in developing an 
understanding of just how the proliferation and deployment trends in Asia 
will affect its strategic future. The shifting balance of power within the 
region suggests that continued attention to these issues is warranted. The 
following essays begin to escort us down that path. 
6 Of course, even those interests were questioned at times; that said, cultural ties and deeply integrated
alliances provided a glue to supplement what was perceived to be a global threat from the Soviet Union. 
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